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ABSTRACT 
This paper presents results obtained as part of the DeepStar 
Phase 10 program on VIV Factors of Safety. The objective was 
to develop a general methodology to calibrate Factors of Safety 
for VIV-induced fatigue and to apply it to partially straked 
risers. This was achieved using reliability methods, accepted 
industry VIV prediction software and state-of-the-art model test 
experiments.  
Most oil companies use a Factor of Safety of 20 when 
predicting VIV damage using VIV software tools. There are 
numerous software tools currently in use in industry to predict 
VIV damage to straked risers and each of them will have 
different accuracy, and therefore an intrinsic level of 
conservatism. Understanding the level of conservatism in 
different VIV prediction software is therefore critical to 
determining what Factor of Safety to use. 
This study benchmarks the latest generation of industry 
accepted VIV design tools at the time of the study (2011): 
SHEAR7v4.6, VIVAv6.5 and VIVANAv3.7.24 against high 
quality VIV data from three separate straked riser experiments. 
A bias distribution (predicted to measured VIV damage results) 
is obtained for each software tool as a function of the strake 
coverage.  
 
A novel reliability framework approach is then developed to 
incorporate all uncertainties associated with VIV fatigue 
prediction into a limit state function, including variability in 
met-ocean conditions and variability in the fatigue resistance of 
the material characterized by a design S-N curve. The limit 
state function is analyzed using First Order Reliability Methods 
to develop Factors of Safety for target probabilities of failure. 
The general method is then applied on two case studies 
involving an SCR and TTR in Gulf of Mexico loop currents, 
but it can be easily extended to different locations and riser 
configurations. The resulting FoS range from about 1 to 15 for 
most software, and are lower than industry standards for VIV 
prediction. The FoS do not vary markedly for different riser 
configurations, indicating the possibility of reducing excess 
conservatism when predicting VIV damage on straked risers. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 Understanding the level of conservatism for VIV fatigue in 
riser design is an important issue for operators. A significant 
body of research exists on developing new VIV models and 
improving existing ones, and benchmarking VIV software 
against experiments, see for example the blind predictions of 
laboratory measurements of VIV of a tensioned riser ([1], [2]).  
 
 
Downloaded From: http://proceedings.asmedigitalcollection.asme.org/pdfaccess.ashx?url=/data/conferences/asmep/77079/ on 04/05/2017 Terms of Use: http://www.asme.org/about-asme/terms-of-use
 2 Copyright © 2013 by ASME 
Field experiments ([3], [4], [5]) and analysis of full-scale data 
([6], [7], [8]) have confirmed the existence of complicating 
factors in VIV such as in-line vibrations, higher harmonics, 
intermittent behavior, travelling waves and chaotic sensitivity 
to small perturbations. These phenomena are only in the earliest 
stages of being included, if at all, in VIV fatigue analysis 
software. 
 State-of-the-art VIV fatigue design programs make the best 
use of available knowledge, but remain limited for the 
abovementioned reasons in their capacity to capture the broad 
complexity of VIV. In addition to more generic uncertainties 
with regard to structural capacity, such as variation in material 
properties and S-N curves, much uncertainty is linked to the 
amount and relevance of data available to understand and 
characterize VIV phenomena on full-scale risers.  
 To date, reported VIV fatigue damage to tubular sections 
of drilling risers has been minimal. Further, fatigue failures 
have not occurred in Steel Catenary Risers (SCR's), Top 
Tension Risers (TTR's) or Tension Leg Platform (TLP) 
tendons, indicating a high degree of design conservatism. This 
conservatism will have attracted significantly higher costs for 
deepwater riser applications. 
 Recognizing the industry’s need to further develop an 
understanding of the values of FoS for VIV design, DeepStar 
funded a work program on VIV Factor of Safety. The work 
program was DeepStar Phase 10 Project 10401 for the Floating 
Systems Committee.  
 It is clear that riser VIV fatigue life estimates will always 
include significant, intrinsic uncertainties and approximations. 
There is a need to account for these in a rationally derived FoS. 
The objective of this work is to provide a rational basis for 
developing appropriate fatigue FoS for VIV and to demonstrate 
a benchmarking process on a high quality controlled 
experimental dataset. 
 This work presents a demonstration of the approach to 
determine the FoS for real configurations (SCR and TTR) 
based on experimental results from small to medium scale riser 
VIV data. The same approach would be valid in the advent of 
full-scale production riser VIV fatigue data. Previous attempts 
to calibrate VIV fatigue FOS have been made ([9], [10], [11]). 
The current method is developed from the limit state function 
formulation in [11], with the main differences being the 
inclusion of the riser design life and the S-N uncertainty of the 
riser material.  
 Previous work for DeepStar VIV FoS investigations [11] 
used NDP 38m riser model test data, as well as a basic limit 
state function. The new FoS results presented here are drawn 
from three experimental campaigns to characterize VIV 
response. Software has been updated since [11], and the new 
results are based on the most recent versions of all VIV 
prediction software, using default parameters. Additionally, 
FoS are calculated using AMOG's multiple-event limit state 
function, including damage from multiple currents and 
uncertainties in the S-N behavior of the riser material.  
 
 
 This work contributes to a consistent management of the 
risk associated with VIV by providing practical information to 
riser specialists regarding risk management for production 
risers with partial strake coverage, including consequences 
associated with the choice of the VIV software and the user 
input parameters. 
NOMENCLATURE ! Riser diameter !! Actual/measured cumulative damage from VIV !! Predicted total damage from VIV software !!!(!!) Predicted damage rate for current !! !!(!!) Probability of current occurrence !"# Factor of Safety ! Limit State Function, defining failure when ! ≤ 0 ! Number of cycles to failure found from S-N curve !! Probability of failure !!!"" Probability of failure in the last year of design life ! Resistance variable in Limit State Function !" Reynolds number ! Stress range in S-N curve (or load variable in LSF) !" Strouhal number !!" Time of operation ! Current magnitude ! Proportion of total probability-weighted damage  
from one current profile (damage density) ! Software bias random variable of predicted damage 
divided by measured damage !!"#$ Equivalent bias for predicted and measured damage 
from sum of multiple currents ∆ Damage parameter from material S-N characteristics ! Scale parameter for GEV distribution ! Location parameter for GEV distribution ! Shape parameter for GEV distribution 
 
 
Methodology for developing VIV Fatigue FoS 
 The methodology for developing a VIV fatigue FoS draws 
on reliability analysis, and consists of: 
• Formulating the Limit State Function (LSF) that describes 
the failure scenario; 
• Identifying and probabilistically characterizing the 
uncertainties involved in the model; and 
• Computing the FoS to reach a prescribed level of structural 
reliability. 
 The LSF used here is an extension of that developed in 
[11] and accounts for uncertainties in both the currents acting 
on the riser, and for the S-N behavior of the riser metal. 
 Reliability analysis requires characterization of the 
probability distributions of each of the random variables in the 
LSF. One random variable characterizing the software 
modeling error, or bias, is formulated from the ratio between 
measured and predicted damage for one particular current.  
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Datasets for this parameter are generated by systematic 
comparisons of predicted and measured damage for given 
currents from the following well-established straked riser tests: 
• Miami2 152.4m (500ft) model riser tests conducted by the 
SHEAR7 JIP and DeepStar JIP in the Gulf of Mexico 
(2006) [12]. (Re=10000-75000,L/D=4200). The Miami2 
experiments are described in ([13], [14] ,[15], [16]) 
• 38m (124.7ft) model riser tests conducted for the 
Norwegian Deepwater Programme (NDP) at Marintek, 
2003-2004 [4]. (Re=8000-65000,L/D=1400) 
• 10m (32.8ft) model riser tests conducted at Marintek for 
ExxonMobil, 2003 [5]. (Re=4000-50000,L/D=500). 
 These data sets are recognized as high quality data taken 
under experimental conditions, and include a large number of 
tests of risers with strakes, which are of significant interest due 
to widespread use of strakes in industry. 
The software used to predict the damage for the riser cases 
were: 
• SHEAR7 v4.6c, run by  Prof. K. Vandiver; 
• VIVA v6.5, run by Prof. M. Triantafyllou; and 
• VIVANA v3.7.24, run by Prof. C.M. Larsen. 
Default parameters were used running each program. 
 The final step in calibrating the FoS to desired levels of 
reliability is to evaluate the LSF and determine the probability 
of failure for multiple FoS. The First Order Reliability Method 
(FORM) was used, see e.g. [17]. Solving the inverse problem 
gives the FoS that lead to given target levels of reliability, in 
this case the annual probability of failure of 10-3, 10-4 and 10-5 
during the last year in operation.  
 
FORMULATION OF THE LIMIT STATE FUNCTION 
 
Background 
 Using reliability theory, we seek to formulate a limit state 
function !, such that: 
 
 ! = ! − !  (1) 
where ! and ! describe respectively resistance of a structure 
and loads. Both ! and ! are described probabilistically using 
random variables. The probability of failure can be found by:  
 !! = !"(! ≤ 0)    (2) 
 
Failure Criterion 
 Failure is considered to occur when cumulative damage !! during the time in operation !!"   exceeds the damage 
parameter ∆: 
 
 !!(!!") ≥ ∆    (3) 
where ∆ reflects the large uncertainty arising from the empirical 
nature of the S-N model.  
The annual damage rate !! is computed by differentiating 
damage !! with respect to time (exposure in years) so that the 
previous inequality can be rewritten in the form: 
 ∆− !! ∙ !!" ≤ 0    (4) 
where it can be seen that ∆ is on the resistance side and the 
accumulated damage is on the loading side.   
 
Factor of Safety 
 Following Leira et Al. [9], the FoS is introduced according 
to: 
 !"# = 1 !! ∙ !!"     (5) 
where !! is the annual predicted damage rate from the 
software.  
Normalizing Eq. (4) dividing by !! ∙ !!" gives: 
 
 ∆ !! ∙ !!" ≤ !! ∙ !!" !! ∙ !!"     (6) 
or 
 !"# ∙ ∆≤ !!!!     (7) 
A convenient property of Eq. (7) is that the value of !!" 
has disappeared from the expression. It is, however, implicit in 
the FoS achieved by a design for a given !!". 
 
 
Predicted Damage and Bias Factor 
 The total predicted damage rate along the riser can be 
found by taking the damage rates predicted by VIV software 
for each current profile, multiplied by the current probability of 
occurrence: 
 !!"! ! = !!(!!) ∙ !!!(!! , !)!     (8) 
where !!!(!! , !) is the damage predicted by the VIV software at 
riser position ! when the riser is subjected to current profile !! 
with probability of occurrence equal to !!(!!). For analysis, !! 
is taken at the riser level ! = !!!" that has maximum total 
predicted damage: 
 
 !! = !!(!!) ∙ !!!(!! , !!"#)!     (9) 
 The software bias is defined as the ratio of predicted 
damage rate per year, to measured damage rate per year, taken 
at a specific point on the riser: 
 
 ! = !!!!      (10) 
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The bias is a random variable with distribution fitted to the 
population of the ratio of predicted to measured experimental 
results. 
 The in-situ measured damage rate !! can be approximated 
by its best estimate: 
 
 !! = !!! !!(!!) ∙ !!!(!!)!     (11) 
where different (independent) random variables !! are 
introduced to represent the uncertainty associated with each 
software prediction. !!!!  from Eq. (7) can then be written as: 
: 
  
!!!! = !!!!!     (12) 
 
where each of the weights !! is given by: 
 
 !! = !!(!!) ∙ !!!(!!) !!(!!) ∙ !!!(!!)!     (13) 
An equivalent bias !!"#$ is then defined as a function of all 
weights and bias variables according to: 
 
 
!!!! = !!!!! = !!!"#$    (14) 
Limit State Function 
The inequality describing failure during the design life !!" 
is called the Mean Time to Failure LSF, and is given by:  
 
 !! = !"# ∙ ∆− !!!"#$    (15) 
with probability: 
 !! = !"  [!"# ∙ ∆− !!!"#$] ≤ 0    (16) 
It is noted that in the single current case, for example to 
perform a check on an isolated survival event, the single event 
limit state function used in previous work is recovered. 
 
Predicted Damage and Bias Factor 
The inequality describing failure before the last year of the 
design life is: 
 ∆≤ !!(!!" − 1)    (17) 
which can be normalized as before, to give the resulting LSF: 
 
 !! = !"# ∙ ( !!"!!"!!) ∙ ∆− !!!"#$    (18) 
The annual failure probability in the last year of design life is:  
 
 !!!"" = ! ! !! ≤ 0 − ! ! !! ≤ 0     (19) 
The direct problem involves calculating !!!"" for a range of 
FoS. The inverse problem consists of solving for the FoS which 
give target levels of !!!"" which can then be compared with 
what is specified in the design guidance. 
MEASURED AND PREDICTED DAMAGE 
 The project used strain data collected from three 
experimental campaigns involving risers with different strake 
configurations in measured currents (both uniform and shear): 
• Miami2 152.4m (500ft) model riser tests conducted by the 
SHEAR7 JIP and DeepStar JIP in the Gulf of Mexico 
(2006) [12]. (Re=10000-75000,L/D=4200) 
• 38m (124.7ft) model riser tests conducted for the 
Norwegian Deepwater Programme (NDP) at Marintek, 
2003-2004 [4]. (Re=8000-65000,L/D=1400) 
• 10m (32.8ft) model riser tests conducted at Marintek for 
ExxonMobil, 2003 [5]. (Re=4000-50000,L/D=500). 
 
These data from large model test basin and controlled field 
experiments are recognized as high quality, having been taken 
from rigorously designed experiments with relatively dense 
instrumentation arrays, and include a large number of tests of 
risers with strakes, which are of significant interest due to 
widespread use of strakes in VIV suppression.  
 This section describes the calculation of measured damage 
from the strain data obtained from the experiments, and 
specification of riser parameters to be used as inputs for the 
three VIV software programs. 
 
Miami2 500ft DeepStar Small Reynolds Number Field 
Test Data 
 The SHEAR7 JIP (MIT) and the DeepStar JIP conducted 
the 2006 Gulf Stream tests (‘Miami2’) [12], which are 
described in [13], [14], [15], [16]. The experimental setup is 
presented in Figure 1. There were 45 partially straked cases, 
with 40% bottom straked, 50% staggered straked, and 50% 
center straked configurations as shown in Figure 2.  
Each set of cases contained current data taken from an 
ADCP device during that test. A number of cases were rejected 
from further analysis, reducing the number retained for the 
present study to 24, due to a number of criteria, including: 
• Extremely low strain response data  
• Tests where hammers were used to stimulate riser 
response, resulting in vibrations not caused by VIV 
• Other anomalous cases with very high or low response 
given the comparison of current input data to other tests.  
 
 The Miami2 riser data had to be pre-screened extensively 
as it was conducted in a variety of environmental conditions, 
some of which affected the validity of the data collected, as 
well as technical errors in the field resulting in anomalies. The 
original (45) cases of 40% bottom straked, 50% staggered 
straked, and 50% center straked riser cases were restricted to a 
subset of 24 cases. This selection was based on data quality 
issues with the rejected cases.  
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Figure 1: Experimental set-up for the Miami2 tests 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Strake configurations for the Miami2 tests 
 
38m NDP Riser Data Obtained at Marintek 
 These experiments are detailed in [4]. A total of 121 cases 
were analyzed here, including both 50% straked and 100% 
straked configurations.  
 Each set of cases contains a monotonically increasing 
value (0.1m/s) of velocity from 0.3 to 2.4 m/s, with both shear 
and uniform current. As per the Marintek description [4], there 
are 22 different velocities in each set, except 100% straked 
sheared cases which have only 11.   
 
10m Riser ExxonMobil Data Obtained at Marintek 
 These experiments are detailed in [5]. 120 cases were 
analyzed, including 25%, 50% and 75% strake configurations.  
 Each set of cases contains a monotonically increasing 
value (0.1m/s) of velocity from 0.2 to 2.38 m/s, with both shear 
and uniform current. There were 20 current cases for each 
configuration/current type pair. 
 
 
 
Measured Damage 
 Measured damage was calculated from strain gauge 
readings at known levels down the risers. The strain time series 
were rainflow counted using the WAFO toolbox [18] and the 
DNV F2 single slope curve [19] was used to calculate an 
equivalent annual damage rate for each experiment. The 
Miami2 data set required considerable data analysis to calculate 
measured damage, see [12]. 
 An important observation from the strain time series and 
calculation of measured damage was the presence of higher 
harmonics in the strain signals. All cases from the three 
experimental campaigns showed strong cross-flow frequency 
excitation at the characteristic VIV frequency: 
 !!"! = !"∙!!     (20) 
However, the Miami2 experiments, unlike the ExxonMobil and 
NDP experiments, showed significant contributions from the 
third and fifth harmonics (3!!"!   and 5!!"!), particularly in the 
Miami2 40% bottom and 50% middle strake tests. Where 
higher harmonics occurred, the measured damage could be 
significantly higher than if the riser responded only at the first 
harmonic (Strouhal frequency). The measured damage was 
calculated with all higher harmonics included, with rainflow 
counting of the complete strain time series. 
 
Predicted Damage 
 For each data set, predicted damage was calculated using: 
• SHEAR7 v4.6c, run by  Prof. K. Vandiver; 
• VIVA v6.5, run by Prof. M. Triantafyllou; and 
• VIVANA v3.7.24, run by Prof. C.M. Larsen. 
 All inputs to the VIV prediction software were selected to 
maximize fidelity to the experimental setup. Default values of 
software parameters were used for all the runs. Predicted 
damage was calculated at levels down the riser corresponding 
to sensor levels providing measured damage. 
 
Scatterplots 
 Measured and predicted damage were compared for each 
riser experiment, at each available level, and for different 
software. The resulting scatterplots of measured vs. predicted 
damage are presented on log-log plots, see Figures 3, 4 and 5. 
 All analysis results indicate that the design points leading 
to failure scenarios are found at high measured damage. As 
such, the inclusion of the scatter at the lower end of the damage 
plot lacks relevance to the reliability of a practical fatigue 
damage calculation. Damage scatter plots show that the 
variation in the scatter for lower measured damage points was 
considerably larger than for higher measured damage. As such, 
it was determined to apply the damage threshold cutoff 
developed in [11] with a factor of 0.5, retaining only the upper 
half of all measured damage points for each strake 
configuration.  
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Figure 3: SHEAR7 Predicted v Measured Damage – Miami2 
 
Figure 4: VIVA Predicted v Measured Damage – Miami2 
 
Figure 5: VIVANA Predicted v Measured Damage – Miami2 
 
 
CHARACTERISING THE BIAS DISTRIBUTION 
Each point on the predicted and measured damage scatter 
plots (Figures 3, 4 and 5) gives a unique value of !. Values of ! greater than 1 correspond to scatter plot points above the line 
of equality, and to conservative predictions. Values of 1 
indicate equality, and values below 1 are indicative of non-
conservative estimates as damage is under-predicted. 
The bias factor ! in the LSF’s of Eq. (15) and Eq. (18) is 
interpreted as a random variable with an associated probability 
distribution. The probability distribution chosen to fit ! must 
describe the “tail” correctly, i.e. the low values of !. Low 
values of the bias represent VIV predictions that are under-
predicted compared to experiments, and so are more likely to 
lead to premature failure if not properly accounted for via the 
FoS.   
 
 
Fitting Theoretical Distributions to the Bias Indicator  
To account for the long tails often evident in the 
observation of the bias distribution, an extreme value 
distribution was selected. These are distributions of the 
Gumbel, Frechet and Weibull types, which map maxima and 
minima of independently and identically distributed random 
variables. These distributions are very commonly used in 
structural engineering for finding likelihoods of events that are 
more extreme than any observed prior. 
 The generalized extreme value (GEV) distribution (also 
known as the Fisher-Tippett distribution) is the general form of 
a family that includes the asymptotic distributions mentioned 
above. The PDF for this three-parameter family is given by: 
 ! ! = !! [1 + !(!!!! )](!!! !!) ∙ exp  (−[1 + !(!!!! )]!!! ) (21) 
where: 
• ! is a location parameter. 
• ! is a scale parameter. 
• ! is a shape parameter.  
 
The distribution type is governed by the shape parameter, !. The sub-families defined by ! = 0, ! > 0,  and ! < 0 
correspond respectively to the extreme Gumbel, Frechet and 
Weibull type, i.e. distributions of extremes (maxima) from 
random samples following various distributions. It is important 
to note that ! and ! here are not equal to the mean and standard 
deviation of the normal distribution, though they change the 
shape of the distribution in a similar manner.  
 The Matlab function 'gevfit' was used to fit the GEV 
parameters to log bias distributions for different strake cases 
and prediction software. An example fit is shown in Figure 6. 
 All distributions of the log bias were best fit with a GEV 
Type 3 (Weibull) distribution. This was consistent across all 
experiments, strake configurations, and software tools. 
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Figure 6: GEV distribution fit to log bias distribution for NDP 
38m 
 
 
Fitting Distribution Tail 
 An example CDF of the log bias from the fitted extreme 
Weibull distribution is shown in Figure 7. The CDF is shown 
with a log axis, to demonstrate the fit for small probabilities in 
the tail region. The distribution must fit the tail region 
preferentially to the body of the data, since this is where the 
design point occurs. The design point is the value of the 
random variables at which the probability of failure is 
calculated, being the most likely point of failure. A manual 
adjustment to each of the distributions was performed, 
changing parameters to visually optimize the fit in the tail area 
where the FORM design point is found, generally with CDF 
around 10-1 to 10-3. The fitted Weibull extreme distribution 
corresponding to Figure 7 is shown in Figure 8.  
 
 
Figure 7: GEV CDF fit Miami2 riser, 50% middle strakes. 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Adjusted GEV CDF fit Miami2 riser, 50% middle 
strakes. 
 
 
Distributions used in the LSF 
In the LSF, the adjusted tail extreme Weibull distribution is 
only valid in the tail of the distribution, where it is 
demonstrated to visibly match the experimental bias data 
points. The two most damaging current cases in the LSF’s        
Eq. (15) and Eq. (18) have been assigned !! with the adjusted 
tail distribution outlined here. The rest of the current cases have 
been assigned !! with normal distributions fit to the whole 
population of log bias results. The reason for using different 
distributions is that the design point from FORM analysis, 
indicating the most likely failure point, is always found with a 
low value of !! for only the highest damage current, with all 
other !! near mean level. As such, only the most damaging 
current needs to be modeled correctly using a distribution 
accurate in the tail, i.e. at very low values. The remaining 
current cases have values of the bias variable very close to the 
mean at the design point. 
This assumption has been checked using sensitivity 
analysis on the distribution types used for different currents, as 
well as verifying the design points from FORM where failure is 
calculated to occur.  
 
FoS Numerical Computation 
The procedure for calculating FoS is: 
• Fit appropriate distributions to the log bias distributions. 
• Find the distribution to model the damage parameter ∆    
(S-N strength). This is outlined in Annex A. 
• Calculate the riser and current-specific weights !!. This 
procedure will be outlined in the following sections, and is 
referred to as deterministic VIV analysis. 
• Solve the two multiple event LSF's Eqs. (15) and (18) for a 
range of FoS using FORM, and calculate the annual failure 
probability !!!"" from the difference. 
• Interpolate the results to give the required FoS to achieve 
specified levels of reliability. 
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The multiple event LSF is solved using First Order 
Reliability Method (FORM). The inverse problem to find the 
FoS for a target reliability level is then solved by linear 
interpolation of the results.  
The software package used to run FORM was FERUM 
(Finite Element and Reliability Using Matlab) v3.1 [20], an 
open-source uncertainty quantification toolbox for Matlab.  
Results have been verified using Monte Carlo sampling 
and importance sampling around the design point to find the 
failure probability. Both these methods are significantly more 
time-intensive than FORM and produce varying solutions, 
though close agreement with FORM was found. It also 
provides no information about the sensitivity of the failure 
probability to the input parameters.  
CASE STUDY: GOM SCR AND TTR 
 In this section, FoS for VIV fatigue are calculated for a 
generic 2500m SCR and 1500m TTR in 1500m water depth. 
Both riser models have strakes in the top 300m of their length, 
in the region of highest currents. Currents were selected from a 
scatter of GOM loop currents, including probability of 
occurrence, as in [21]. The calculation of FoS for these 
example risers is performed while quantifying all variables in 
the limit state function to illustrate the procedure. Conservative 
bounding values of the resulting FoS can be used to attain a 
specified level of reliability for VIV fatigue in future riser 
design.  
 
Deterministic VIV Analysis for Typical SCR and TTR 
The typical 2500m SCR and 1500m TTR were analyzed 
using the three VIV software programs, along with current 
cases from the scatter diagram of probability-weighted loop 
currents for a representative site corresponding to GOM. The 
current cases included 50 shear current profiles corresponding 
to loop currents that occur on average 71 days per year. The 
contribution of non-loop currents to VIV damage was 
neglected.  
For the deterministic VIV analysis, damage rates !!!(!! , !) 
were calculated for each current case at 1m intervals along the 
riser. These damage rates were multiplied by the current 
probability of occurrence !!(!!) to give probability-weighted 
damage. The probability-weighted sum of damage from all 
current cases !!(!!) ∙ !!!(!! , !)!  was calculated for each riser 
node, and the riser level ! with maximum damage selected for 
worst-case analysis. The 50 current profiles were ranked 
according to their contribution to the total probability-weighted 
damage at the worst-case level. The normalized damage rate 
corresponds to the weights !!. 
 The results of the deterministic VIV analysis for SHEAR7, 
SCR are typical, shown in Figure 9, where the vertical axis is 
the value of the weights !! corresponding to the contribution of 
each current case to the total probability-weighted damage at 
the level with highest damage. Typically, damage from the 
worst 3 to 4 current profiles causes about 75% of total damage.  
For the purposes of FoS analysis, the top 15 weights !!!!" 
from the 15 most damaging currents were included with distinct 
random bias variables !!!!". The remainder of the current 
cases, accounting for less than 10% of the damage, were 
lumped as one weight parameter !!" equal to the sum of 
weights of the 35 least damaging currents, and one bias variable !!".  
 
Figure 9: Proportion of total damage from 15 most damaging 
currents, also corresponding to first 15 weights !!. 
 
Annual Failure Probability 
 The annual probability of failure !!!"" was calculated 
using !! (Eq. 15) and !! (Eq. 18) which respectively give the 
probability of failure in the design life !!", taken here as 25 
years, and the probability of failure before the final year. The !! were calculated using the deterministic analysis for both 
risers. !! follow distributions fitted to the predicted to measured 
damage results, and ∆ is a log-normal distributed random 
variable detailed in Annex A. 
 Both LSF's were calculated using FORM for both the SCR 
and TTR, for each software tool, and for a range of FoS from 
0.25 to 500. The annual failure probability !!!"" decreases with 
increased FoS, and the relationship is non-linear.  
 
Design Point 
The design point from FORM results indicates the most 
likely values of all random variables in the LSF to contribute to 
a failure point. For each run using FORM, FERUM provides 
the design point in terms of the values of all random variables, 
including the bias random variables !!!!"; and damage 
parameter ∆. 
An example of the bias variables at the design points for 
different !!!"" is given in Figure 10. For all simulations 
performed, the values of the bias at the design point were 
characterized by: 
• Bias random variable !! at a low, and decreasing, value 
('in the tail of the distribution'). 
• Bias random variable !! at an intermediate point. 
• Bias random variables !!!!" found very close to the mean 
values. 
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 The design points indicate a failure scenario involving the 
most damaging current being significantly underestimated, 
other currents not contributing significantly, and S-N strength 
at a low value. 
 It is important to note that the value for !! is around 10-1.5 
for !!!"" = 10!!, 10-2 for !!!"" = 10!!, and 10-2.5 for   !!!"" = 10!!. This is because about half the contribution to a 
low probability failure event comes from the bias variable 
reaching a low value, and the other half comes from the 
damage parameter reaching a similar outlying level. This is 
important as the bias distribution will only be fitted at these low 
probabilities with sufficient data points. In the VIV experiments 
conducted, there were usually around 100-300 individual bias 
values fit in the distribution, and so the lowest bias value will 
have a CDF of 10-2 to 10-2.5. This means that there are only a 
few bias data points near the distribution fit at the low levels 
used to predict !!!"" = 10!!. 
 
 
Figure 10: Design point log bias values for decreasing !!!"" – 
SHEAR7 SCR, Miami2 40% bottom strakes 
 
 
Final FoS 
 In the final stage of the computation, the FoS required to 
achieve specified targets !!!"" = 10!!, 10!!  &  10!! for the 
design SCR and TTR were interpolated from the values of !!!"" calculated using FORM. A graphical interpretation of the 
interpolation procedure is given in Figure 11, for the TTR 
designed with VIVA, using bias distributions found from 
different Miami2 riser strake configurations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Interpolation of !!!"" – VIVA TTR, Miami2 
 
The upper bound FoS to achieve target levels of reliability for 
the SCR and TTR are given below for both SHEAR7 and 
VIVA: 
 
Software & 
Version 
Fatigue FoS for !!!"" at: !"!! !"!! !"!! 
SCR TTR SCR TTR   SCR TTR 
SHEAR7v4.6c 4.7 4.4 8.4 7.5 13.4 11.5 
VIVA v6.5 0.8 1.3 1.4 2.4 4.0 6.8 
Table 1: Summary of Bounding FoS for partially straked risers 
DISCUSSION 
The required FoS increases for lower target annual 
probability of failure (10-3, 10-4, 10-5). Between 10% and 50% 
of the FoS is due to S-N uncertainty, whilst the remainder is 
due to VIV prediction. Even with all these uncertainties 
included in the analysis, the final FoS are considerably lower 
than those currently used in industry (~20).  
The study focused on data sets from straked risers. There 
was considerable variation between results from different 
software tools, and also between different strake tests using the 
same software. For this reason, it has been decided that the 
approach most useful to riser designers is to select conservative 
upper bounds on the FoS values found, and use these in 
recommended practice.  
The differences found between FoS values derived from 
the TTR and SCR were small, indicating the general 
applicability of the results across different structures. This 
raises the possibility of using these target FoS in the GOM for a 
new riser using these software tools, without re-performing 
reliability analysis.  
A detailed study of the variability of the target FoS derived 
in different met-ocean conditions has not yet been conducted. 
The final FoS is heavily influenced by the most damaging 
currents. This offers the promise of accurately determining the 
FoS at a given site by including only the few most damaging 
currents.  
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Conversely, it is extremely important to include even low-
probability currents that may cause high VIV damage, as these 
currents could dominate the calculation of the final FoS. As 
more target FoS are derived in different sites, confidence in the 
robustness of bounding FoS values will increase. It is expected 
that this will result in design levels of FoS significantly lower 
than the current industry standards. 
Results from VIVANA were incomplete, and the 
deterministic VIV analysis for TTR and SCR could not be 
performed. Therefore, no final FoS have been calculated at this 
stage for VIVANA. However, the accuracy and precision of 
VIVANA have been investigated using VIVANA predictions 
for the three riser experiments conducted, giving an indication 
of the software performance and the likely magnitude of the 
FoS. For all three VIV tests, VIVANA was significantly less 
conservative than SHEAR7 and VIVA, often predicting much 
lower damage than was calculated from experimental results.  
A higher FoS would be required for VIVANA than for 
SHEAR7 and VIVA to achieve a similar level of reliability. 
Current VIV prediction software tools do not predict 
damage due to higher harmonics of VIV. This lack of 
conservatism has been included in the FoS calculated here, 
since the measured damage used in the bias calculation includes 
strain response at all frequencies.  
Future work should draw on any full-scale production riser 
data when available to increase the confidence in the results 
and their applicability. Full-scale riser data would be 
particularly useful in clarifying the existence of higher 
harmonics in the VIV response. Preliminary indications from 
data collected on the Allegheny Steel Catenary Riser confirm 
the existence of higher harmonics on full-scale production 
risers.  
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper provides a detailed methodology developing a 
sound, reliability based Factor of Safety for tubular riser design 
that is quantitatively linked to target levels of reliability. The 
methodology can be applied during riser design as a check of 
the required FoS to reliably account for uncertainties in S-N 
behavior, met-ocean conditions and software prediction of VIV.  
The FoS derived here to meet target levels of reliability are 
in the range 1-15, depending on software and desired level of 
reliability. These are significantly lower than the current 
industry standards of 20.  
The FoS are robust to changes in riser geometry. Ongoing 
research by the authors suggests that similar values of FoS are 
found in different current profiles, including the North Sea. 
However, more investigation is required in different met-ocean 
conditions to be confident of using general FoS without 
performing this reliability assessment. At present, it is prudent 
to apply this methodology during new riser design with location 
and project-specific distributions of all key uncertainties.  
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ANNEX A 
 
The limit state function includes the damage parameter ∆ 
as a random variable. The objective of this section is to 
characterise the distribution of the damage parameter. As ∆ is a 
measure of the value of the damage at failure, there is a 
theoretical link between the distribution of the damage 
parameter and the uncertainty associated with S-N curves.  
 
Melchers [17], Section 6.8 “Fatigue analysis” describes the 
reliability framework for modelling S-N behaviour: 
“The traditional model to describe the fatigue life !! of a 
component or structure under constant-amplitude repeated 
loading is given by, for example, the American Society of Civil 
engineers (ASCE) (1982)  
 !! = ! !!!        (22) 
where ! and ! are conventionally taken as constants, but as 
random variables here, and !! is the number of stress cycles at 
constant stress amplitude !!. Test results normally allow ! and ! to be estimated. Typically, conservative values are used such 
that Eq. (22) produces a safe estimate of fatigue life. For a 
reliability analysis, the model given by Eq. (22) must be a 
realistic rather than a conservative predictor, so that typical 
values for ! and ! quoted in the literature may not be 
appropriate… 
In practice the amplitude of the stress cycles is not 
constant but is a random variable. If the number of cycles 
which occur at each amplitude level can be measured or 
estimated, the empirical Palmgren-Miner hypothesis 
 !!!!!!!! = ∆      (23) 
is often adopted. Here !! represents the actual number of 
cycles at the stress amplitude !!. If the stress amplitudes are all 
different, then: 
 !!!!!!! = !!!!!!! !!! = ∆     (24) 
where ! is the total number of (random) variable-amplitude 
cycles. The damage parameter ∆ is conventionally taken as 
unity but may typically lie in the range 0.9-1.5. Hence ∆ reflects 
the (large) uncertainty arising from the empirical nature of Eq. 
(22). A lognormal distribution with unit mean and a coefficient 
of variation of about 0.4-0.7 appears appropriate [Madsen, 
1982; ASCE, 1982].”   
 
 
 
 
 
 
The damage !! and !! have been calculated using the 
DNV F2 Class design S-N curve [19] for air, which is identical 
to seawater with cathodic protection, but without an endurance 
cutoff. This is based on statistical analyses of appropriate 
experimental data and provides the linear relationship between !og  (!) and !og  (!)  in the form 
 log ! = log ! −!"#$(!)    (25) 
or 
 ! = ! !!        (26) 
where:  
• !  is the conservative number of cycles to failure under 
stress range; 
• ! is a constant relating to the mean S-N curve minus two 
standard deviations; 
• ! is the inverse slope of the S-N curve for Class F2; and 
• !"# is the logarithm with base 10. 
 
The constant ! in Eq. (25) is given by 
 log ! = log ! − 2!"#(!)    (27) 
where: 
• log  (!) is the mean value observed during numerous 
experiments; and 
• log  (!) is the value of the standard deviation of log  (!) 
observed during the experiments. log ! = 11.63 and log ! = 0.2279  for DNV F2 Class. 
 
The mean-valued DNV F2 S-N curve is given by  
 ! = ! !!        (28) 
where log ! = 12.09. 
 
Figure A1 shows a comparison of the design S-N curve in 
red, and the mean S-N curve in black, with 100 random points 
following the distribution with mean log ! = 12.09 and with 
standard deviation for DNV F2 Class: log ! = 0.2279. As can 
be seen, the design S-N curve is significantly conservative. 
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Figure A1: Class F2 S-N curves. Comparison between 
the “true” and codified S-N curves. 
 
To find the damage parameter distribution, firstly, the true 
number of cycles !′ to failure is given as a random variable: 
 !! = !! !!       (29) 
where !! is a random variable with mean value equal to ! and 
distribution given by 
 !! = 10(!(!!!"# ! ,!!!"#  (!)))    (30) 
where the notation !(!,!) is used to represent a Gaussian 
distribution with mean value !  and standard deviation !.  
 
The true total damage from variable amplitude loading is 
calculated using the Miner-Palmgren rule, i.e. summing each of 
the individual damage !! according to: 
 !!"#$ = !! = !!!!!     (31) 
where ! is the number of cycles in the stress range !! and !!! is 
the number of cycles to failure for that stress range. The 
limiting value of damage is 1. 
However, when the damage is calculated using the 
conservative ! from the design F2 Class S-N curve, as is the 
case with the measured and predicted damage, the total damage 
will follow: 
 ! = !! = !!!!     (32) 
The value of ! in terms of !!"#$ is equal to 
 ! = !!!!! . !!!!! = !!"#$ . !!!!!     (33) 
Since the value of !!"#$ at failure is 1 (by the definition of 
Miner's Rule), the value of the damage predicted using the 
conservative S-N curve at failure (∆) is equal to 
 ∆= 1 ∙ !!!!!      (34) !!!!! is constant between all stress states i, for a given realization 
of the S-N curve. 
 !!!!! = !!! = 10(!(!!!"# ! !!"#  (!),!!!"#  (!)))    (35) 
giving 
 ∆= 10!       (36) 
where 
 !~!(! = 2log ! ,! = log ! )    (37) 
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